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INTRODUCTION
When the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB" or
"Board") decided M.B. Sturgis, Inc.' (hereinafter "Sturgis") in August
2000, it issued a long-awaited, controversial opinion2 that has the potential
to transform the face of temporary employment in the United States. In an
economy where employees have been steadily losing union representation
as companies increasingly rely on temporary workers and other contingent
employment arrangements, the Board's pronouncement in Sturgis has
opened a legal avenue for previously-unrepresented employees to bargain
with their employers. Throughout most of the 1990s, temporary employees
needed the consent of both their temp agency and user employer in order to
bargain collectively alongside permanent employees.3 Sturgis returned the
Board to its pre-1990 precedent by removing the joint-employer consent
barrier4 that has kept nearly every temporary employee from collective
t B.A. 1999, Brown University, J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Clyde Summers for all
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1. 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (2000), available at 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, (Aug. 25,
2000).
2. Four years passed between the oral arguments for Sturgis and the issuing of the
decision. See id. at *7-8.
3. Id. at *32-33.
4. Although the Board did not historically require joint employer consent before
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bargaining in the last decade.5 As a result of this decision, temps may now
be part of their user employer's union as long they share a community of
6interest with the permanent employees. In the aftermath of Sturgis it
should become easier for temps to participate in collective bargaining and
possibly secure wages and benefits that are equal to those of permanent
employees.
Although Sturgis deals specifically with temporary employees
working for joint employers, temporary work arrangements are part of a
growing phenomenon known as "contingent work,' 7 a practice which has
eroded the rights and working conditions of many employees in recent
decades. Contingent employees, including temporary workers, are not
generally afforded the full protection of labor and employment laws,' nor
do they share equality of wages and benefits with the permanent employees
alongside whom they work.9 In addition, the majority of these employees
would actually prefer permanent employment but are unable to attain it.' °
Sturgis provides a means of legal protection to one segment of this
workforce by making it easier for temporary employees to be included in
unions.
Sturgis, however, cannot be the end of the road. First, it is not yet
entirely clear that NLRB will apply the decision to achieve the fullest legal
protection for temporary workers, as evidenced by the Board's application
of Sturgis in at least one recent opinion. Second, a huge segment of the
contingent workforce will still not get the benefit of Sturgis's legal
protections. Although Sturgis helps to protect temporary employees
sanctioning a collective bargaining unit made up of permanent and temporary employees,
see, e.g., Jewel Tea Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 508, 509-510 (1966); Thriftown, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
603, 607 (1966); Frostco Super Save Stores, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 125, 128-129 (1962), it
began doing so in 1990. See Lee Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1990).
5. Prince Mgmt. Corp., 1995 NLRB LEXIS 389, at *20 (May 2, 1995); Hexacomb
Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 983, 983 (1994); Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. 592, 592
(1993); Flatbush Manor Care Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. 591, 591 (1993); Hughes Aircraft Co., 308
N.L.R.B. 82, 82 (1992); Int'l Transfer of Florida, 305 N.L.R.B. 150, 150-151 (1991); see
also Clyde Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18-4 COMP. LAB. L.J.
503, 513 (Summer 1997).
6. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546 at *57.
7. Roberta Spalter-Roth & Heidi Hartman, Gauging the Consequences for Gender
Relations, Pay Equity, and the Public Purse, in CONTINGENT WORK 69, 72 (Kathleen Baker
& Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998).
8. See Kathleen Christensen, Countervailing Human Resource Trends in Family-
Sensitive Firms, in CONTINGENT WORK 103, 121 (Kathleen Baker & Kathleen Christensen
eds., 1998).
9. Sharon R. Cohany et al., Counting the Workers: Results of a First Survey, in
CONTINGENT WORK 41, 51-53 (Kathleen Baker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998).
10. Eileen Appelbaum, Structural Change and the Growth of Part-Time and Temporary
Employment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 1, 3
(Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992); Cohany, supra note 9, at 50.
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working for joint employers, they are just one class of contingent
employees. Many other contingent employment relationships exist that
need legal protection but do not fit the Sturgis model. Furthermore, even
employment relationships that do fit the Sturgis model will not always fall
under NLRB jurisdiction. With unions representing less than fifteen
percent of the present workforce," the likelihood that temps will work at
unionized workplaces is low. Thus, inclusion of temporary workers in the
collective bargaining units can only be one step toward achieving full legal
protection for this growing segment of the working population. Much
more is needed in the form of legislation and policy set forth by other
government agencies, besides just the NLRB.
Thus, Part I of this Comment exposes the contingent workforce's
demographics and explains the problems it creates for employees. An
overview of the contingent workforce shows that contingent employees
need greater legal protection and equality with their non-contingent
counterparts. This conclusion serves as the premise for the rest of the
arguments this Comment raises.
Part II is a discussion of the Sturgis decision and an examination of its
application. This section explores the precedent for Sturgis and illustrates
that the decision is consistent with the NLRB's historic stance toward
temporary workers. Although the Board left some questions unanswered in
Sturgis, it has recently begun applying the opinion. This section also
examines how the NLRB is presently interpreting Sturgis and proposes a
framework for the decision's future application to protect temporary
workers.
Finally, Part III addresses the inability of the NLRB alone to protect
contingent employees. This section is a discussion of contingent worker
protection in a broader perspective, outside the realm of collective
bargaining. Here, the comment looks at potential legislation designed to
protect contingent workers. It also stresses the need for the Internal
Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") to join in the effort of generating
policy to protect contingent employees and improve the quality of their
working conditions.
I. WHO IS THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE?
Employment relationships created by the use of temp agencies as in
Sturgis are just one kind of situation which fall under an umbrella of
arrangements referred to as "contingent work." 12 The umbrella typically
covers a variety of employment forms including part-time, temporary, self-
11. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS IN 2000
(Jan. 17, 2001), available at http://www.bIs.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
12. Spalter-Roth & Hartman, supra note 7, at 72.
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employed independent contracting and occasionally home-based work."
To get a fuller picture of the background for the Board's decision in Sturgis
and to illustrate that protection of contingent workers is important, a closer
analysis of the whole contingent workforce is necessary.
Although researchers and legal scholars have not reached a uniform
consensus, most definitions of contingent employment emphasize three
dominant characteristics of the practice.' 4 The first of these factors is the
work schedule dimension of contingent employment. 15 The daily schedule
of contingent employees is often temporary or unpredictable in nature, and
the duration of contingent employment is generally short-term. 16 Wage and
benefit adequacy is the second distinguishing factor. 17 Contingent workers
are often paid less than non-contingent workers, and they typically receive
little or no benefits.18 The third characteristic concerns the relationship
between contingent employees and their employers, 9 which is usually
20impermanent and detached.
In practice, contingent employment takes many forms. In one use,
corporations may directly hire temporary employees.2' Companies often
use these kinds of employees for a number of reasons, including covering
permanent employees who are on leave or out sick and staffing high
demand periods that are seasonal or cyclical.22
Companies can also hire temporary employees through agencies, and
those workers technically remain employees of the agency, not the
company utilizing their labor.2' This is precisely the kind of contingent
24
employment relationship to which Sturgis applies . Although the user
company often supervises and disciplines these temporary employees, the
temporary employment agency is responsible for their payment and
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 73.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Kathleen Baker & Kathleen Christensen, Controversy and Challenges Raised by
Contingent Work Arrangements, in CONTINGENT WORK 1, 4 (Kathleen Baker & Kathleen
Christensen eds., 1998).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Although Sturgis addresses only temporary employment arrangement, rather than
the umbrella of contingent employment arrangements, it still has the potential to affect a
large number of people. Temps account for .9% of the present workforce, a percentage
which amounts to 1.2 million employees. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm.
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training.25  Thus, the user company actually buys the agency's services
through its purchasing department, rather than supervising the employees
through its human resource department.
26
Hiring employees as independent contractors on a project-by-project
basis is another way firms utilize contingent employment.27 In this case,
the individual is self-employed, and the company pays for the job on a
contract basis without putting the independent contractor on the payroll.2s
Finally, many organizations are expanding the horizons of contingent
employment by outsourcing entire functions, such as data analyses,
janitorial, cafeteria, and security services.29 In these arrangements a
subcontractor company often takes over an entire department of the
enterprise.3°
Obviously, these kinds of employment relationships are beneficial to
employers.31 Organizations can cut labor costs by not having to pay higher
wages, provide benefits, or contribute to social security and pension
32plans. Moreover, outsourcing entire functions and hiring long term
temporaries allows employers flexibility and, in some cases, prevents
massive lay-offs of its permanent employees when business is slow.
33
However, while affording many benefits to employers, contingent
employment is often detrimental to employees in many ways. Most
contingent employees are involuntarily working on a contingent basis.34 In
other words, they would prefer to hold permanent, full-time jobs rather than
temporary, part-time jobs. Many temporary workers perform the same
functions as permanent employees in similar positions but are paid less and
afforded no benefits.35  Some companies even illegally misclassify
employees as independent contractors.36 This practice precludes these
25. Baker & Christensen, supra note 21, at 4.
26. Christensen, supra note 8, at 103.
27. Baker & Christensen, supra note 21, at 4.
28. Id. at 5.
29. /d. at 4.
30. Id.
31. On the other hand, some critics of contingent employment argue that it can actually
be detrimental to companies because workers are less productive. Companies often will not
invest in training temporaries because these workers will not be there long term. See
Stanley D. Nollen & Helen Axel, Benefits and Costs to Employers, in CONTINGENT WORK
126, 135 (Kathleen Baker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998). Although, hiring temps
allows companies to cut costs on wages and benefits, the lower productivity associated with
many contingent employees often makes the unit labor cost higher. Id. at 134. Also,
because they lack attachment to the enterprise, contingent employees often do not possess
the morale that would make them efficient workers for the company. Id. at 135.
32. Summers, supra note 5, at 512-13.
33. See Nollen & Axel, supra note 31, at 128.
34. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 3; Cohany, supra note 9, at 50.
35. See Cohany, supra note 9, at 51.
36. Christensen, supra note 8, at 121.
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people from protection under any of the labor and employment laws
because they no longer meet the definition of "employee.
3 7
Only as recently as 1995, did the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(hereinafter "BLS") begin compiling data on the contingent workforce. As
of February 2001, the United States' workforce was 4% contingent,
according to the BLS. 3 8 However, other researchers have estimated a much
higher percentage, up to 29%." Regardless of which numbers are correct,
it is clear that the contingent workforce has been growing in recent years.
In fact, some estimate that it is expanding at a greater rate than the
permanent workforce. According to one expert, there are "strong grounds
for asserting that the contingent workforce is growing considerably faster
than the entire labor force.., and that a significant number of jobs
generated in the 1980s and early 1990s were contingent jobs."40 A recent
survey estimates, in fact, that between 1982 and 1998 the number of jobs in
the temporary help supply industry rose 577%, while the total number of
jobs in the workforce grew only 41%.41
Moreover, this growing use of contingent employment relationships is
most likely not determined by worker's needs for alternative work
arrangements. Rather, it is a demand-led phenomenon and determined by
the needs of individual firms for labor flexibility.4 2 In other words, because
these relationships benefit companies' bottom lines, their use is becoming
more widespread in corporate America.
Admittedly, some contingent employees have the bargaining power to
negotiate contingent arrangements that are favorable to them,43 and
37. Id.
38. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 24. In its estimates, the BLS defines contingent work as "all
wage and salary workers who do not expect employment to last." Id. The estimate includes
some independent contractors as well, qualified by survey participants' answers to questions
about the nature of their self-employment. Id.
39. Based on statistics compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census's Survey of Income
and Program Participation in 1990, one researcher estimates that the percentage of
contingent workers in the workforce ranges from 16% at the lowest to possibly 29% at the
highest. Spalter-Roth & Hartman, supra note 7, at 76-78. Richard S. Belous, a seasoned
scholar in the field of contingent employment and the Vice President and Chief Economist
at the National Planning Association in Washington, D.C., contends that BLS has severely
undershot its estimate and suggests that the contingent employees make up at least 25% of
the workforce. Richard S. Belous, Symposium: The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The
Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 867-68 (1995).
40. Id. at 868.
41. See CONTINGENT WORKERS: INCOME AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF THE REST
OF WORKFORCE, GAO/HEHS-00-76, cited in M.B. Sturgis, Inc. 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at
*4-5 (Aug. 25, 2000).
42. Francoise J. Carre, Temporary Employment in the Eighties, in NEW POLICIES FOR
THE PART-TME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 45, 70-74 (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992).
43. See Chris Tilly, Short Hours, Short Shrift: The Causes and Consequences of Part-
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contingent employment can be beneficial to some employees. 4 However,
the majority of contingent workers are thrust into this type of employment
involuntarily because of their low skill and weak bargaining positions
before employers who are leading the demand. In fact, over half of
contingent employees would prefer, but are unable to obtain, permanent
jobs. 5 On average, contingent workers make at least 20% less than
permanent workers per week.46 Only 20% of contingent employees receive
health benefits from their employers, and approximately the same small
percentage are eligible to participate in pension plans. 7 Very few
48contingent employees are unionized.
Other striking characteristics of contingent employees are that women
hold approximately 50% of contingent jobs, while men hold approximately
53% of permanent jobs.49 In addition, Blacks and Hispanics are over-
represented in the contingent workforce, compared to the workforce at
large. In 1988, over two thirds of the workers living under the poverty
Time Employment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 15,
20 (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992) (discussing "retention part-time jobs," which are often
negotiated by skilled employees who are very valuable to the company and desire
alternative working arrangements).
44. For example, temporary employment can provide flexibility for those who are
unable or do not choose to commit themselves to a steady job. Summers, supra note 5, at
512. It can also "provide[] a stop-gap for those out of work" or in between jobs and "serve[]
as a bridge to a new job" if the user employer "recruit[s] from their... [temporary] staff."
Id. "In addition, temporary employment [can] provide valuable on-the-job training for those
with few skills or little experience." Id.
45. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 24 (estimating that 52% of workers would prefer non-
contingent jobs). The most common reason employees gave for working a contingent job
rather than a permanent one was that it was the only job they could find. Steven Hipple,
Contingent Work in the Late-1990s, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2001, at 3, 17.
46. See Cohany, supra note 9, at 51. The most recent statistics on the contingent
workforce do not compare the median salaries of contingent and non-contingent workers,
but the 1999 BLS data showed that the median salary of contingent workers was $218 less
than permanent employees. Hipple, supra note 45, at 20.
47. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 24.
48. Hipple, supra note 45, at 12 (estimating a unionization rate of only 5.9% among
contingent employees as of 1999); Spaulter-Roth & Hartman, supra note 7, at 82; see also
Virginia L. duRivage, New Policies for the Part-Time and Contingent Workforce, in NEW
POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 89, 116-18 (edited by Virginia
L. duRivage, 1992).
49. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 24; see also Cohany, supra note 9, at 63 (estimating an even
greater percentage for women working in the contingent workforce).
50. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 24 (estimating that Blacks and Hispanics make up 13% and
17% respectively of the contingent workforce, compared to 11% and 11% respectively of
the non-contingent workforce).
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line were working contingent jobs.51 In fact, some have even said that
contingent employment is becoming a mask for America's underlying
52unemployment problem. As for independent contractors, it is estimated
that 38% of employers dodge payroll taxes by illegally misclassifying
employees as independent contractors.53
In sum, the contingent workforce is rapidly expanding. Although,
contingent employment can sometimes be beneficial to the employees,
most of this workforce is involuntarily working on a contingent basis.
Contingent employees generally receive lower wages, no benefits, and
some receive little protection under labor and employment laws.
Companies, on the other hand, continue to have incentive to use temporary
workers, and the negative effects of contingent employment on workers are
not likely to subside if the situation is left to the corporations alone. For
this reason, it necessary that government agencies and the legislature step
in to ameliorate the negative effects of the practice. In Sturgis, the NLRB
took a step toward achieving this result.
II. M.B. STURGIS: THE DECISION
A. Background
Despite its contradiction of a decade's worth of precedent, Sturgis is
actually a decision in harmony with the Board's historical treatment of
contingent employees. Lee Hospital, the rule of the Board for the last ten
years, barred collective bargaining for temps absent the consent of both
their temp agency and their user employer.5 4 Nonetheless, a closer look
beyond Lee Hospital shows that the rule of Sturgis, which permits temps to
join their user employer's union as long as they share a community of
interest with the permanent employees,55 is much more consistent with the
Board's traditional treatment of temporary employees. Since the inception
of the National Labor Relations Act5 6 ("NLRA" or "Act"), the Board has
looked to the community of interest test to decide whether temporary
employees should be a part of their user employer's collective bargaining
unit. Lee Hospital, not Sturgis, departed from this standard when it added a
consent element. Sturgis brings the determinative inquiry back to the
51. duRivage, supra note 48, at 92.
52. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 15-16.
53. Virginia L. duRivage et al., Making Labor Law Work for Part-Time and Contingent
Employees, in CONTINGENT WORK 263, 270 (Kathleen Baker & Kathleen Christensen eds.,
1998).
54. Lee Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 947 (1990).
55. M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *57 (Aug. 25, 2000).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2002).
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question of community of interest, not consent, and thus restores the
Board's policy toward contingent workers to its historical precedent.
Before beginning a full discussion of Sturgis's holding, a brief outline
of the precedent for the decision and the terminology it imparts is
warranted. Considering the fact that temporary employment agencies were
conceived of in the 1940's,57 the concept of user and supplier employers is
not a new one. The temp agency has traditionally been considered the
"supplier" employer, while the employers to whom the agency assigns its
employees have been considered "user" employers.58 With regard to the
employees involved in these arrangements, the user and supplier have
generally been considered "joint employers," as long as they both exercise
control over the workers.59 Whether or not two employers qualify as joint
employers may not be perfectly clear in every instance, and these
relationships do not always arise from the use of temp agencies. 6°
Nonetheless, the user/supplier framework is important for understanding
the case law dealing with joint employers.
Under the NLRA, the Board determines the collective bargaining units
61of an employer. Section 9(b) of the Act provides, "The Board shall
decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof., 62 This is the only guidance the
NLRA gives for the treatment of employers in defining collective
bargaining units, so the Board's interpretation of "appropriate" units for
employees of joint employers has been spelled out through case law.
From the 1940's through 1960's, there was little controversy over how
the Board should construe the NLRA to deal with joint employers. The
cases regarding joint employers that came before it during that period only
asked the Board to determine whether user employer units could include
employees jointly employed by other employers.63 In its decisions, the
57. George Gonos, The Interaction Between Market Incentives and Government
Actions, in CONTINGENT WORK 170, 172 (Kathleen Baker & Kathleen Christensen eds.,
1998).
58. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *10.
59. Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board's Treatment of
Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1105,
1117 (2000).
60. Leased employees can present a similar relationship with regard to the user
employer as do temp agency-supplied employees. Summers, supra note 5, at 514.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
63. The early cases involving joint employers arose from department stores' collective
bargaining units that sought to include concessionaire employees, who worked on the
premises and were jointly employed by the store and an outside company. See, e.g., S.S.
Kresge Co. v. N.L.R.B., 416 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1969); Jewell Tea Co., 162 N.L.R.B.
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Board based its determination of the user's collective bargaining unit
exclusively on whether its jointly and solely employed workers shared a
community of interest.64 Using this test, the Board routinely found units of
a single, user-type employer appropriate, regardless of whether some of
those workers were jointly employed by other employers.65 The relevant
inquiry was always whether or not the two classes of employees shared a
community of interest.
1. Greenhoot
Then, in 1973, the Board decided Greenhoot, Inc. ("Greenhoot"),
66
which introduced a new rule for a new situation. Greenhoot was a property
management company in the District of Columbia that operated fourteen
buildings, each one owned by separate individuals.67 Both Greenhoot and
the individual property owners shared responsibility over the employees
employed at each of the fourteen sites.6' Nonetheless, there was no
employee interchange among the buildings.69  The engineers and
maintenance employees at all of the fourteen properties Greenhoot
managed petitioned the Board to certify a single unit for the purposes of
bargaining with Greenhoot.70 The Board, however, held that the group of
employees would constitute a multi-employer unit and thus require
Greenhoot's consent as well as the consent of all fourteen individual
property owners for certification.7' Certification of the unit would not only
force Greenhoot to the bargaining table, but it would inherently force the
fourteen unrelated property owners to bargain together as well, hence the
term "multi-employer unit."
Consequently, Greenhoot introduced a question that the Board had
never decided up to that point. It was not a case where one employer's
jointly and solely employed workers wanted to bargain together. In fact,
due to the nature of Greenhoot' s business as a management company, it did
72not solely employ any of the employees seeking union representation,
rendering it a supplier-type employer for purposes of NLRB case law.
508, 509 (1966); Thriftown, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 603, 604 (1966); Frostco Super Save Stores,
Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 125, 125 (1962); Stack & Co. 97 N.L.R.B. 1492, 1494 (1952); Denver
Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1168 (1947).
64. See NLRB cases cited supra note 63.
65. 165 BNA LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER 33 d17 (Sept. 11, 2000).
66. 205 N.L.R.B. 250 (1973).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 250-51.
69. Id. at251.
70. Id. at 250.
71. Id. at 251.
72. See id. at 250.
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Instead of a petition for certification of a user-type unit, Greenhoot
presented a situation where employees, who only had a supplier-type
employer in common, were trying to organize across multiple user
employers.
To this different question, the NLRB gave a different answer by
introducing a consent requirement where multiple user employers are
involved. Moreover, Greenhoot's treatment of multi-employer units can be
explained through the same logic that prevents employees in a similar craft
from forming industry-wide units. It has long been a rule of the NLRB
that, but for a few narrow exceptions, industry-wide, craft units are
impermissible, absent consent from all employers involved because they
could force not just unrelated, but often competing, employers to adopt the
same contractual terms and conditions with their labor supply. 73 A supplier
employer unit is analogous to an industry-wide unit in that unrelated,
multiple, user employers would have to bargain together with employees
without explicitly agreeing to do so. 4
Thus, Greenhoot's reasoning flowed from a different premise than the
prior decisions of the Board. It addressed the requirements for a unit where
the common employer of the workers trying to organize was the supplier
employer, not the user employer. Moreover, for nearly thirty years after
the decision, the Board distinguished its reasoning in Greenhoot from the
logic that combines the temporary and permanent employees of a common
user employer in the same bargaining unit. In fact, Greenhoot itself
recognized that the individual property sites could have separate user-type
units, which would include each site's jointly employed workers with
Greenhoot, without requiring consent from either employer.75 Furthermore,
the case law after Greenhoot indicates that the Board continued to certify
user-employer units without requiring consent, as long as the permanent
and temporary employees passed the community of interest test.
7 6
2. Lee Hospital
Nevertheless, in 1990, the Board abruptly turned the logic of
Greenhoot on its head when it decided Lee Hospital.77 This case neglected
to follow the established treatment of joint employers. Lee Hospital
contracted with Anesthesiology Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "AAI") for the
73. See duRivage, supra note 53, at 272; accord Bonanno Linen Services Inc. v. NLRB,
454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982).
74. But see id. at 272-74 (advocating the adoption of industry-wide units).
75. Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. at 251.
76. See U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 139 (1980); Sun-Maid Growers of
Cal., 239 N.L.R.B. 346 (1978); Walgreen La. Co., Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 213 (1974).
77. 300 N.L.R.B. 947 (1990).
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78latter to run its Anesthesiology Department. The hospital employed
certified registered nurse anesthetists (hereinafter "CRNAs"), who worked
under the supervision of hospital personnel as well as the personnel
supplied by AAI.79 These CRNAs sought certification of their own unit to
bargain with Lee Hospital.80 The Board denied certification because the
CRNAs did not warrant a separate unit from the rest of the employees in
the hospital . In its reasoning, the Board commented that a threshold
question to the analysis was whether or not Lee Hospital and AAI were
joint employers8 2 It decided that the hospital was the sole employer, but
then went to deny certification because the CRNAs failed an unrelated
"disparity of interests" test, rendering a separate unit for them in the
hospital inappropriate. 3
Thus, Lee Hospital did not actually rule on the question of when the
Board should require joint employer consent. It never reached the issue
because it decided that AAI and Lee Hospital were not joint employers. 4
The Board merely mentioned in dicta that had the two been joint
employers, Greenhoot would have applied, and the unit would require joint
employer consent for the Board to certify it.8 5
Nonetheless, even if the Board had found Lee Hospital and AAI to be
joint employers, a CRNA bargaining unit still should not have required
employer consent under Greenhoot. Greenhoot required employer consent
where employees of a supplier employer sought to certify a unit across a
number of user employers. Conversely, the CRNAs in Lee Hospital all
86worked for the same user employer, Lee Hospital. They wanted to certify
a unit for the purpose of bargaining with their common user employer.8 7
That they might have been jointly employed by AAI should not have
mattered. Thus, Lee Hospital had nothing to do with Greenhoot multi-
88employer bargaining involving different user employers.
In the years following Lee Hospital, however, the Board adopted the
decision's dicta, and began expanding the holding of Greenhoot.s 9 It
implemented a rule that required joint employer consent, even where the
unit in question was for a single user employer's solely and jointly
78. Id.
79. See id. at 947, 949-50.
80. Id. at 947.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 948.
83. Id. at 948, 950.
84. Id. at 950.
85. Id. at 948.
86. See id. at 947-50.
87. Id at 947.
88. M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *35 (Aug. 25, 2000).
89. See, e.g., Hexacomb Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 983 (1994); Int'l Transfer of Fla., 305
N.L.R.B. 150 (1991).
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employed employees who passed the community of interest test.90 By
requiring the consent of both employers, the Board created a new barrier
that has prevented temporary employees from gaining inclusion in their
user employer's bargaining unit.
In the last decade, virtually no temporary employees have succeeded
in obtaining the consent of both joint employers, which has effectively
barred them from collective bargaining.9' This fact, in conjunction with the
rapid growth of contingent employment practices, has led the Board to
reconsider the precedent it established ten years ago in Lee Hospital.92
Sturgis represents this reconsideration.
B. The Case
The Sturgis decision actually consists of two separate cases. Although
the Board handed down a single decision, it is helpful to summarize the
facts of each case separately.
1. M.B. Sturgis, Inc.
The first employer, M.B. Sturgis, Inc. (hereinafter "Sturgis"),
produces and sells flexible gas hoses.93 Local 108 filed a petition with the
NLRB to represent all of the employees at one of Sturgis's local plants.94
At that time, the plant solely employed thirty-four or thirty-five employees,
and it also employed, on a permanent basis, ten to fifteen "temporary"
workers, supplied by Interim, Inc. (hereinafter "Interim"), a national
corporation providing temporary help personnel.95 Local 108 sought to
represent only those thirty-four or thirty-five permanent employees of
Sturgis, but Sturgis wanted to include the temporary workers as well.96
The temporary employees and permanent employees worked side by
side, performing the same functions and working the same number of
hours. 97 Both groups were also subject to the same supervision." The
temporary employees were not, however, permitted to work more than
90. See id.
91. Prince Mgmt. Corp., 1995 NLRB LEXIS 389, at *20 (May 2, 1995); Hexacomb
Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 983, 983 (1994); Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. 592, 592
(1993); Flatbush Manor Care Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. 591, 591 (1993); Hughes Aircraft Co., 308
N.L.R.B. 82, 82 (1992); Int'l Transfer of Fla., 305 N.L.R.B. 150, 150-151 (1991); see also
Summers, supra note 5, at 513.
92. See Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *3.
93. Id. at*10.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *lO- 11.
97. Id. at*10.
98. Id.
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forty hours a week, whereas the permanent employees could work more
than forty hours a week.99 Interim hired and set the wages and benefits of
the temporary employees.'0°
Both Interim and Sturgis agreed that they were joint employers for the
purposes of the NLRA.'' Moreover, Sturgis gave its consent for the
temporary employees to organize.0 2 Interim, however, did not give
consent.10 3 Local 108 did not want to include the temporary workers in the
union, arguing that Greenhoot and Lee Hospital precluded their inclusion
without Interim's approval.'04
2. Jeffboat Division
The other case making up the Sturgis decision dealt with a similar
situation, only in this case, the employer refused to give consent while the
union petitioned to represent the temporary employees. The employer,
Jeffboat Division (hereinafter "Jeffboat"), is an inland shipbuilder,
operating a large shipyard on the Ohio River.0 5 At the time of the petition,
Jeffboat employed 600 production and maintenance employees, all of
whom were represented by Local 89.106 Jeffboat also employed thirty first-
class welders and steamfitters who were supplied by a temporary supplier
firm, Tr&O Enterprises (hereinafter "TT&O"), and were not represented
by the union.'0 7 Local 89 sought to accrete'0 8 these employees into the
existing collective bargaining unit, but Jeffboat and TT&O both refused to
give their consent.'O
Like the temporary workers of M.B. Sturgis, Jeffboat's temporary
steamfitters and welders had much in common with the 600 permanent
employees. Jeffboat supervisors assign, direct, and oversee all of the work
of the temporary employees."0 In addition, the supervisors have the
authority to discipline temps for poor performance or for breaking any of
Jeffboat's rules and regulations, and they are also responsible for
monitoring the time that TT&O-supplied workers spend on different
assignments at Jeffboat. I"
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at*11.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at*12-13.
106. Id. at *13.
107. Id.
108. See infra note 140 and accompanying text (defining accretion).
109. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at * 14.
110. Id. at *13.
111. Id.
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3. The Board's Holding and Analysis
With the Sturgis and Jeffboat situations presenting similar material
facts, the NLRB faced one glaring issue to decide: "Whether and under
what circumstances employees who are jointly employed by a 'user'
employer and a 'supplier' employer can be included for representational
purposes in a bargaining unit with employees who are solely employed by
the user employer."' 1 2 Following Lee Hospital, the Regional Directors in
both Jeffboat and Sturgis had stopped their inquiries and barred the
inclusion of temps in the units as soon as they found that there was no joint
employer consent." 3 The Board, however, found that this was no longer
the proper inquiry and went about clarifying that the test for including
temps in user employer units is community of interest.'
1 4
In its analysis, the Board used the statutory language behind the issue
to justify its conclusion. It cited Section 9(b) of the NLRA as giving the
Board the power to determine whether the appropriate collective bargaining
unit should be "the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof."".. It then clarified that an appropriate employer unit can be "a
unit encompassing all of an employer's employees, or subgroup of such
employees."" 6 The Board correctly asserted that a unit of all the user
employer's employees consists of those employees solely and jointly
employed by it." 7 From this conclusion, the Board then determined that
the temporary employees of both Jeffboat and Sturgis could be considered
part of the "employer unit" because they were employed alongside the
other employees who were solely employed. 8 In other words, the fact that
the temporary employees were also employed by a supplier employer
should have no bearing on whether they constitute part of the user
employer's bargaining unit.
Instead, the decision held that the only question relevant to the
supplied employees being part of the user employer's collective bargaining
unit should be whether or not the two sets of employees share a community
of interest.' 9 Reiterating the traditional community of interest test, the
Board commented that a proper determination of an employer unit
"examines a variety of factors to determine whether a mutuality of interests
112. Id. at * 1. Since none of the employers in Sturgis disputed their joint employer
status, the Board needed only to determine what the proper test should be for including
jointly employed employees in a user employer's collective bargaining unit.
113. Id. at *43.
114. Id. at *40.
115. Id. at *35 (citing section 9(b) of NLRA).
116. Id.
117. Id. at *36.
118. Id.
119. See id. at *42.
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in wages, hours, and working conditions exists among the employees
involved.' 2°  The Board did not actually do an analysis to determine
whether the Sturgis and Jeffboat employees satisfied the community of
interest test. It instead remanded the cases to the Regional Directors to
determine whether the employees passed this test.'21
Although the NLRB did not ultimately rule on the fate of the Jeffboat
and Sturgis employees, its holding and the reasoning behind it overturned
the test used during the last ten years for determining collective bargaining
units of user employers. In fact, the Board explicitly overruled Lee
Hospital.122 It also narrowed the holding of Greenhoot, which had been
used to justify the Lee Hospital decision. 1 3 The Board explained that it
was not overruling Greenhoot,124 but rather limiting the holding to true
multi-employer units, bargaining units consisting of the employees from
multiple user employers, "whose only relationship to each other is that they
obtain employees from a common supplier employer."' 125 Following the
Sturgis Board's interpretation, a true multi-employer situation necessitating
consent should only exist where a union tries to represent employees of a
supplier employer in a unit that spans across user-employers. "Lee
Hospital did not involve multiemployer bargaining and therefore no
consent was required."'
26
In sum, the Board's analysis sets out that the first question is whether
joint employer status exits.'27 If no such relationship exists, then the
inquiry stops because Sturgis only applies to jointly employed
employees. 28 On the other hand, if the user and supplier employers are
joint, then the next step is to determine whether a community of interest
exists between the jointly employed and solely employed employees of the
user employer. 129 If the employees satisfy the community of interest test,
then the Board will sanction an employer unit consisting of both the
120. See id. at *40-41; see, e.g., Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137
(1962); Swift & Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1391, 1394 (1961); Cont'l Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777,
782-83 (1952).
121. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *57.
122. Id. at *3.
123. See id. at *37-38.
124. See id.
125. Id. at *38.
126. Id. at *35.
127. See id. at *18. The Board commented that it would not decide in Sturgis whether or
not the test for joint employers should be expanded. Id. This comment seems to address
and dismiss the possibility of moving the joint employer test away from the present "right to
control test." See generally, Rahebi, supra note 59 (elaborating on the differences between
the "right to control test" and "economic realities test," and advocating a "hybrid test" for
joint employer determination).
128. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *18.
129. See id. at *41-42.
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temporary employees and permanent employees of the user employer. 30
Consent from neither the user nor supplier employer is necessary at any
point in the analysis.
III. APPLYING STURGIS TO PROTECT CONTINGENT EMPLOYEES
The reasoning of Sturgis being consistent with precedent, the next
question to consider is how the decision can operate to effectuate its
purported purpose of protecting contingent workers.' 3' After Sturgis, temps
have the opportunity to bargain collectively in at least three different
scenarios. First, temps of an agency may seek to bargain with the agency
as either a unit of a particular class of workers or an agency-wide unit."'
Second, the temps of a single employer may seek to bargain in a unit
composed only of temps for that employer. Third, a union of permanent
employees could seek to accrete the employer's temps into the existing
collective bargaining agreement.1 33 The first possibility actually pre-dated
Sturgis, since it requires neither joint nor multi-employer bargaining, as the
temps seek only to bargain with the temp agency.13 The second two
scenarios, however, are new possibilities in light of Sturgis, so the
following sections will address them more specifically.
A. A Unit Consisting Solely of a User Employer's Temps
A collective bargaining unit consisting only of temps working for a
single employer would inevitably require the temp agency and user
employer to work together in some fashion. It would, however, be
different than the kind of multi-employer bargaining Greenhoot forbids.
Sturgis holds that section 9(a) of the NLRA does not preclude a single
employer's unit from containing jointly employed employees.1 35 Pursuant
to that majority opinion, it is legal now for a unit of temps to exist within a
user employer and to bargain with that employer.
The Sturgis dissent, however, argues that it is a violation of section
130. See id. at *42.
131. See id. at *54.
132. Rahebi, supra note 59, at 1113-14.
133. See, e.g., Tree of Life, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 845 (Dec. 1, 2000).
134. Agency-wide units, however, may still be difficult to certify because the employees
will not likely share a community of interest. See Robert B. Moberly, Temporary, Part-
Time, and Other Atypical Employment Relationships in the United States, 38 LAB. L.J. 689,
693 (1987) ("Although a few temporary help companies have collective bargaining
agreements establishing the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of their temporary
employees, such bargaining relationships with unions are the exception rather than the rule
in the temporary help industry."); see also infra discussion at 38. Classes of similar
employees within a temp agency would thus be more likely to gain certification.
135. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *39-40.
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9(a) for an employee unit to answer to more than one employer, claiming
that "having one employer in common differs fundamentally from having
the same employer." 136  Even though the dissent was overruled, it is
important to note 137 that its concerns should nonetheless be alleviated by
the fact that it is not even necessary for a unit of temps to bring both user
and supplier employer to its bargaining table to effectuate Sturgis. A temp
unit could bargain exclusively with the user employer, leaving the temp
agency and user employer to deal with each other on a contract basis. In
fact, the unit could consist of temps from multiple suppliers as long as it is
dealing exclusively with the user employer. In other words, if the union
represents a class of employees working for the user employer (i.e., its
temps), then it need only bargain with that employer, the same as in any
non-joint collective bargaining arrangement. After bargaining with the
union as to the terms and conditions of the temps, the user employer would
be the one to deal with its various suppliers on a contract basis. 3 ' Under
this scenario, the prospect of bargaining between the temp unit and a
supplier employer does not have to be an issue. Rather, the employers
would deal exclusively with each other through contractual remedies over
any problems arising as a result of the collective bargaining agreement
between the temp unit and the user employer. Thus, the user employer and
supplier employer will have to work together, but not through the collective
bargaining process that could potentially violate the Act, according to the
Sturgis dissent.
B. Accreting Temps into a Unit of Permanent Employees
When the Board remanded Sturgis to the Regional Directors to apply
the community of interest test, it also noted that the Regional Directors
should determine whether to accrete the temps into the unions or not.
139
Accretion is a process through which the Board adds new employees to an
136. Id. at *107 (Brame, Member, dissenting).
137. The composition of the NLRB has completely changed since Sturgis was decided.
President Bush has appointed several pro-management members this year, and none of the
members in the Sturgis majority presently sit on the Board. See Sherie Watson & Tom
Ichniowksi, Labor: Bush Announces NLRB Recess Appointments, WASH. OBSERVER, Feb. 4,
2002, at 9. It is consequently important to examine alternative grounds for supporting the
results in Sturgis in light of the fact that the new Board could reconsider its prior holdings.
138. For example, if the temp unit bargained with the user employer for high wages, the
user employer would then have to pay the temp agency more money in its purchase
agreement. The agency would then pass the additional money on to the temps in the form of
higher wages. c.f Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *46-47 ("Since employers will be
obligated to bargain only over those terms and conditions over which they have control, we
believe.., that employers and unions will be able to formulate appropriate and workable
solutions to logistical issues that may arise.").
139. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *43.
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existing group without holding an election.140 It generally should do this
where there is an "overwhelming community of interest" between the
additional employees and the pre-existing unit.141  If the terms of an
existing collective bargaining agreement provide protection for the unit into
which temps are accreted, then the temps will automatically receive those
protections as well.
42
Again, it is important to address the Sturgis dissent's concerns about
accretion. 43 Member Brame argues that accreting temps into an existing
collective bargaining agreement would illegally bind the supplier employer
to an agreement it did not bargain over. 44 The 1982 Supreme Court
opinion in Bonanno Linen Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 145 nonetheless, provides
overlooked support for why accreting temps into an existing union should
be permissible.
The court in Bonanno held an employer to have committed an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA when it withdrew from a
contractual multi-employer bargaining association during the negotiation
process with a particular union.' 46 The New England Linen Supply
Association was a group of ten employers in the linen industry that all
agreed to bargain together with the union representing their truck drivers.
47
The employers did not have to enter into a multi-employer bargaining
situation with the union because, as Greenhoot illustrates, multi-employer
bargaining must be consensual. 14  Nonetheless, the court held that where
the employers have consented to be a part of a multi-employer association,
it is an unfair labor practice for them to withdraw once collective
negotiations are underway between that association and a union.
4 9
140. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 7, 11 n.3 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 853 (1971).
141. Safeway Stores, Inc. 256 N.L.R.B. 918, 918 (1981). Even if the community of
interest between the new employees and the existing unit is not so overwhelming for
accretion, the Board can still hold an election in which all of those employees may vote for
or against the union. See J.E. Higgins Lumber Co., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 764, at *6 (Oct. 31,
2000) (Hurtgen, Member, concurring). Thus, temps may not always pass the test for
accretion, but they could still have the opportunity to vote for a union, which would
represent them and the permanent employees.
142. See, e.g., Tree of Life, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 845, at *17 (Dec. 1, 2000) (in the
wake of Sturgis, ordering an employer to "[a]pply the provisions of its collective-bargaining
agreement to temporary employees").
143. See Lodgian, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 628 (Nov. 14,2000).
144. Sturgis, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *107 (Brame, Member, dissenting).
145. 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
146. Bonanno, 454 U.S. at 413.
147. Id. at 407.
148. Id. at 412.
149. Id. at 411. Once negotiations are underway, an employer may only withdraw from
a consensual multi-employer association if there are "unusual circumstances," such as
extreme financial hardship or fragmentation of the bargaining process. Id. Impasse,
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Extrapolating the reasoning of Bonanno, it follows that where a user
and supplier employer have contracted together to jointly employ temps,
they have essentially agreed to collective bargaining with regard to those
temps. Thus, if the temp agency finds itself in the position of having to
bargain with the union and/or the user employer because its employees get
accreted in the user's collective bargaining unit, it is nothing more than
what the two employers bound themselves to through their contractual
relationship. Under Bonanno, it is conceivable that the employers would
not be entitled to withdraw their consent once the accretion process was
underway. Rather, they should have thought of the implications before
they entered a contractual relationship to jointly employ temps in the first
place. Thus, in light of Bonanno's principles, accretion is a legally sound
mechanism for carrying out the aim of Sturgis.
Accretion is also an extremely effective mechanism for temps to gain
equality of working conditions with the permanent employees alongside
whom they work. Most supplier employers do not provide benefits, "° so
the only opportunity temps will have to get them may be through their user
employer's collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, if temps are
accreted into existing collective bargaining agreements, then they will
automatically gain any protections the permanent employees have under
that agreement. Admittedly, employers could seek inclusion of temps in
their collective bargaining units in hopes of watering down the union's
favor with new, less loyal members. 51 Considering the fact that the• .151
majority of contingent employees would prefer permanent employment,
however, it will probably be the exception, rather than the rule, for temps to
object to any amount of stability a union could afford them. Overall, temps
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by getting the immediate
benefit of union protection.
Accretion is overwhelmingly beneficial for unions too. The best way
to prevent the replacement of full-time employees with a contingent
workforce is to represent the contingent employees."' Unions have already
begun organizing efforts to include temps among their ranks as a result of
Sturgis, and the AFL-CIO recently proclaimed that unionizing temps is a
priority for the organization now in light of the Sturgis decision.
1 54
however, is not an "unusual circumstance." Id.
150. See Christensen, supra note 8, at 124.
151. In Jeftboat, the union sought to accrete the temps into the unit, but in Sturgis, the
employer was the one who wanted to include temps in the union. M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 2000
NLRB LEXIS 546, at *62 (Aug. 25, 2000) (Brame, Member, dissenting).
152. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 1, 3.
153. American Federation of Federal, State, County & Municipal Employees, The Union
and the Contingent Workforce, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REP. (Spring 1996), available at
http://www.afscme.org/wrkplace/cbr296_2.htm.
154. Aaron B. Sukert, Marionettes of Globalization: A Comparative Analysis of Legal
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Although there could be instances where a union may regard the inclusion
of temps as presenting a divergent set of interests from its permanent
employees, 155 this is an easily surmountable problem. Unions can still
negotiate favorable terms for temps without having to make them identical
to those of permanent employees. 5 6 In fact, unions often have different
classes of employees within their ranks and negotiate different terms and
conditions suitable to each class. The important point is that the temps can
have someone negotiating for them now, instead of no one at all.
"[U]nions can be instrumental in improving the job quality and career
opportunities of these workers, without jeopardizing the opportunities for
full-time employment."'
157
In light of its significant benefits to both temps and unions, it is
important for the Board not to overlook accretion as a viable option.
Unfortunately, the NLRB's recent applications of Sturgis suggest that
future Boards could use the option of having a separate unit of only temps
to avoid accretion and defeat the full impact of Sturgis. For example, in
Lodgian, Inc.,'" the Board found inappropriate a unit consisting of
permanent and temporary service employees at a hotel, even though the
temps worked at the same site, wore the same uniforms and performed the
same duties as their permanent counterparts. 59 Applying Sturgis, the
Board decided that the temps did not share a community of interest with the
permanent employees because the supplier employer determined their
benefits and pay as well as retained the right to discipline them, although
not exclusively. 60 Instead, the Board suggested that the temps could form
their own unit for the purpose of bargaining with the user employer.,6 By
using factors that are inherent in every joint-employer situation to defeat a
community of interest test, as it did in Lodgian, Inc., the Board could
prevent temps from ever being included under permanent employees'
collective bargaining agreements.16 Temps can form their own unit within
the user employer, as the Board suggests, but they will still miss out on the
significant benefits that come from being included in an existing unit of
permanent employees, either through accretion or the election process.
Sturgis made clear the background of its decision-the contingent
Protections for Contingent Workers in the International Community, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 431, 474 (2000).
155. Carre, supra note 42, at 79.
156. See duRivage, supra note 53, at 117.
157. Id.
158. 2000 NLRB LEXIS 828 (Nov. 14, 2000).
159. Id. at *28-29.
160. Id. at *29-30.
161. Seeid. at*31.
162. But see Tree of Life, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 845 (Dec. 1, 2000) (applying Sturgis
and ordering a user employer to accrete temps into its collective bargaining unit).
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workforce has been growing while its legal protections have decreased.
63
Clearly, the policy behind the decision is to help temporary workers gain
the protection of unions. Consequently, while Sturgis provided for the
possibility that a group of temps working for a user employer could form a
separate unit from the permanent employees, future Boards should not
forget that Sturgis also meant to give temps protection that is equal to
permanent employees.
C. Striking an Appropriate Balance Between Employers and Temps
Not surprisingly, employers are generally unhappy about Sturgis.'
64
By making it easier for temps to join unions, Sturgis will subvert many of
the benefits temporary employment arrangements provide for employers
who have unions. If unions bargain for temps to receive the similar
treatment as permanent employees, then employers will lose the advantage
they gain by not having to pay benefits for temporary employees. In
addition, an employer who fires a temp for talking about unionizing may
now face discrimination charges for taking an adverse employment action
against an employee engaged in concerted activities.1
61
Nonetheless, temporary employees should not have to bear the costs
of the benefits that their employers save on the backs of their labor. Many
employers have intentionally used temps to dilute their responsibility to
bargain with unions. 166 It is past due that a case similar to Sturgis made it
more difficult for employers to side step the unions who represent their
employees. Moreover, if employers are really using temps for all of the
reasons they claim, 167 then they will not lose every advantage of temporary
employment arrangements. Companies will still retain the flexibility that
temporary employment can provide. 6  After all, Sturgis has not
eviscerated temporary employment practices. The NLRA gave all
employees the right to bargain, 169 and Sturgis simply makes it possible for
163. See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 546, at *3 (Aug. 25, 2000).
164. See, e.g., N.J. EMP. L. LETTER (Dec. 2000); Union May Represent Temps,
PERSONNEL MANAGER'S LEGAL LETTER (Dec. 2000); MINN. EMP. L. LETrER (Oct. 2000).
165. Cf Tree of Life, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 845 (holding that a user employer had violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA when it refused to give the union a list of temporary
employees who shared a community of interest with the permanent employees).
166. duRivage, supra note 53, at 116.
167. "[A] recent Conference Board survey found that 81 percent of employers who hired
contingent workers (usually temporaries) sought labor flexibility, while only 12 percent
cited cost reduction as a factor." Employment Policy Foundation, Fact & Fallacy: NLRB
and Unions' Concern Over the Contingent Workforce is Misplaced (Nov. 1996), at
http://www.epf.org/research/newsletters/1996/ff2- 10.asp.
168. See Summers, supra note 32, at 512.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); see J.E. Higgins Lumber Co., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 764, at
*4 (Oct. 31, 2000) (Hurtgen, Member, concurring) (commenting that "[contingent]
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temps to finally exercise that right.
IV. A UNIFORM POLICY DESIGNED TO PROTECT CONTINGENT WORKERS
CALLS FOR MORE THAN NLRB DECISIONS
The very fact that employers use contingent employment to prevent
unionization illustrates that more is needed to protect contingent employees
than just an NLRB decision regarding unions. With unions representing
under fifteen percent of the present workforce,"7 many employers no
longer have collective bargaining units into which temporary employees
can accrete. The NLRB's decisions only deal with an increasingly smaller
percentage of the working force that is unionized. Thus, Sturgis, which
applies to just a segment of the contingent workforce to begin with, will
only affect temporary employees who work for employers that unions have
been able to reach. To protect the entire contingent workforce, other facets
of the government must get involved.
For example, the IRS is effectively the only agency that can do
anything to protect employees who have been misclassified as independent
contractors. Because these individuals are not considered employees, none
of the labor and employment laws apply to them. 7' Moreover, companies
who misclassify employees as independent contractors often do it to avoid
these laws and to avoid withholding income tax payments for these
employees. 72 The IRS needs to crack down harder on this practice by
increasing its effort to go after these companies for tax evasion.
Additionally, Congress and state legislatures should pass legislation
aimed specifically at protecting the contingent segment of the workforce.
Many contingent workers, for example, are excluded from coverage under
the Family and Medical Leave Act173 because they do not work the
minimum number of hours for coverage due to the part-time, temporary
and/or intermittent nature of their employment. 7 4 Contingent employees
171have family needs the same as permanent employees. Considering the
fact that the majority of these employees are working contingently on an
involuntary basis, Congress and state legislatures should consider
legislation that carves out alternative protection for these employees.
employees have always had Section 7 rights").
170. Unions represent only 9.0% of the private sector labor force. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS IN 2000, supra note 1 I. Including
public sector workers, the total percentage of wage and salary employees represented by
unions is 13.5%. Id.
171. Christensen, supra note 8, at 121.
172. Nollen & Axel, supra note 31, at 141.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-54 (1994).
174. Christensen, supra note 8, at 122.
175. See id. at 123.
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As for affording contingent employees equality of benefits with
permanent workers, Congress should reconsider legislation that would
require employers to offer health benefits on a pro-rata basis to part-time
workers where the same benefits are offered to full-timers. 76 It should also
consider measures that would allow employees to carry pension credits
with them from job to job.
177
Contingent employment appears to be here to stay."' Moreover, it is
not necessary to eliminate the practice in order to balance out the
disadvantages it brings employees with the large amount of benefits it
affords employers. Regulating the industry through government agencies
and legislation can serve to effectuate this balance.
V. CONCLUSION
Contingent employment is a growing phenomenon in the American
economy. The need persists to afford contingent workers reasonable
equality with permanent workers as well as the full protection of United
States' labor and employment laws. Sturgis is a decision aimed at this goal
by removing the consent barrier to collective bargaining for many
temporary employees. Much of the aftermath remains to be seen, but if
future Boards apply the decision in a manner consistent with its goals,
Sturgis has the ability to provide needed protection and equality for at least
somemembers of the contingent workforce. Many others in the contingent
workforce may have to challenge the IRS's practices and lobby Congress
and state legislatures in order to improve their lot, but Sturgis is at least a
step in the right direction down a very long road.
176. See duRivage, supra note 53, at 98.
177. See id. at 103.
178. Belous, supra note 39, at 876.
